The Effects of  Personal Influence  on Learning, Motivation, and Commitment to Voluntary Action by Chubin, Daryl E.
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 
1971 
The Effects of "Personal Influence" on Learning, Motivation, and 
Commitment to Voluntary Action 
Daryl E. Chubin 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chubin, Daryl E., "The Effects of "Personal Influence" on Learning, Motivation, and Commitment to 
Voluntary Action" (1971). Master's Theses. 2561. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2561 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1971 Daryl E. Chubin 
' t 
~ 
f 
f 
! 
., 
! 
·I 
' ! 
' M i 
~ 
I 
F 
I 
I 
' i i 
i 
I 
I I 
I 
on 
The Effects of ''Personal Influence'' 
learning, Motivation, and Commitment to Voluntary Acfion 
Daryl E. Chubin 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty 
of The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirement for the Degree of Maste1 of Arts 
May, 1971 
• 
L----~------------------J 
. , ·~····~ ----------i 
Acknowledgment 
The contributions of many people may be shrouded in the following pages. 
Therefore, I wish to express my gratitude: To Dr. William Bates--advisor, 
task-master, and frlcnd--whose phllosoph~ of what sociological research 
should be I can today barely distinguish from my own; to Dr. Lauren Langman, 
I 
I 
i 
whose curious bler.d of insight and wit has been a needle and pin of criti-
cism and encouragement; to Dr. B. I. C. ljomah, who has instilled in me 
methodological ideals I hope to realize someday; to Dr. Norris Larson who, 
I 
I 
in our brief association, has generated in me enough enthusiasm about ex-
perimental social psychology to last another degree; to two especially able 
Niles College studes--Bruce Such and Bob Schiller--who, with nary a gripe, 
disposed of several of the mundane activities which accompanied this, like 
any, research; to Paul Zelus, who has provided the constant challenge only 
a peer wo1•Jd attempt to provide; and to Vicki, my wife and loving nemesis, 
whose patience with my efforts has been predictably unpredictable. 
To all the above who shared a special part of themselves, I say thank 
you, it helped--and there is more to come . 
• 
Table of Contents 
Chapter I. Theoretical Rationale ...................................... 1 
Chapter II. Research Design . ............................ -..•............ 5 
Control Variables 14 
Hypotheses 17 
Chapter III • Findings and Analysis .......• ~ ..•..•••..•••...••.•••..••.. 19 
Primary Analysis: Testing of Hypotheses 20 
Secondary Analysis: Collapsing of Groups 25 
Chapter IV. Interpretation of Findings.~·····························32 
Efficacy of the Small Group Milieu 32 
Motivation to Learning and Voluntary Action 35 
Attitudes and Behavior: A Methodological Purview 40 
Chapter V. Conclusion . ...................... · ........... ~ .............. 44 
Tables 
References 
• 
-· .. ....,, 
r-···· 
Chapter I 
Theoretical Rationale 
Within the massive 1 iterature on attitude change can be found studies 
that distinguish between the informative and emotion-arousing functions of 
credible communications (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949; Hovland, 
Janis and Kelley, 1953; Katz and Lazarsfe-ld, 1955). Few, however, exp! icate 
the singular role of information and modes of presenting information in moti-
vating individuals to act. The notable exceptions are Fitzsimmons and Os-
burn 1s study of the impact of television news documentaries on the knowledge, 
attitudes, and behavior of the viewer (1968), and Cook, Burd and Talbert's 
examination of the cognitive, behavioral, and temporal effects of confronting 
an experimentally formed belief with action implications of varying saliency 
(1970). Within the framework of these studies, the present research poses 
this question: Does a formal communication (lecture) alone and in conjunc-
tion with face-to-face informal discussion (11personal influence11 ) predispose 
an indivi~ual to participate in an activity based upon information learned 
in the two situations? . 
The paramount influence of personal contact has been demonstrated in 
both laboratory and field settings. From the classic voting surveys of Erie 
County (Lazarsfeld,Berelson and Gaudet, 1948) and Elmira (Lazarsfeld, Berel-
son and McPhee, 1954) emerge panel data 1 and the notion that one 1 s intimates--
- 1 • ' The panel technique involves the repeated interviewing 0 1f a smal 1 
sample. Here the development of preferences for candidates during the 
course of a political campaign was traced. 
-1-
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family, friends, and co-workers--would have much influence on how one thinks, I feels, and acts vis-~-vis specific issues. The role of people in mediating I the flow of ma~s media in contemporary society (Katz, 1957) becomes even more 
I pronounced in a small group (laboratory) situation. Individuals interacting 
I with each other relative to a particular problem which concerns all will 
develop a collective approach to that problem. They eventually create an 
opinion, an attitude, a decision, or an action which they embrace-in common 
(Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:57). 
The hypothesis that an individual will more readily respond to an in-
fluence attempt if he perceives that others support him in.a proposed change 
underlies the "group decisiqn" experiments pioneered by Lewin (1947). His 
work describes the effectiveness of group discussion (followed by "group 
dee is ion") for achieving change. Where the group is the "medium" of change, 
pressure for a particular action to be taken by members of the group ~ 
individuals originates within the group (Cartwright, 1951). This pressure 
exerted by "others" in a milieu that fosters verbal exchange constitutes the 
group salience and situational cues which elicit the desired behavior (Hov-
land, Janis and Kelley, 1953:161-165). Pelz, in replicating Lewin's basic 
design, however, found that group discussion per se and pub! ic commitment 
were not the foremost mechanisms of influence. Rather, the whole process 
of making a decision and the individual 1sperception of group consensus gene-
rated behavioral differences comparable to those obtained by Lewin and his 
associates. This finding prompt~d Pelz to redefine "group decision" as "de-
cision about individual goals in a setting of shared norms regarding such 
goals" (1958:440-444). 
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Thus, while social '"-·' scientists acknowledge the contradictory findings of 
studies conducted under lab as opposed to field conditions (Hovland, 1959; 
Riley and Riley, 1959; Blumer, 1959:205-206; Pool, 1959:239-240), most agree 
that interpersonal communication (i.e., personal influence) i1_ a variable of 
sociological significance (Merton, 1949; Riley and Riley, 1951; Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Menzel and Katz, 1955; Rossi, 1959; Becker, 1970). 
By focusing on the dispensation of information regarding-drug use in 
the U.S., drug terminology, and facts about addicts, emphasis wi 11 be on 
what learning takes place as a result of exposure to different (imposed) 
social milieux (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949; McGuire, 1968; 
Fitzsimmons and Osburn, .1968). Learning will then be measured with respect 
to the subject's (S) willingness to behave in a manner ·consistent with the 
information gained. Rather than dwel 1 ing on the S's evaluation ("affective" 
component of attitude) of a social issue, this study wi l I concentrate on 
making the S aware of facts ("cognitive") and on predicting who will act 
("conative") on the basis of ·those facts, given the opportunity to do so 
(Thurs tone, 1929; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Krech, Crutchfield and 
Bal Jachey, 1962; DeFJeur and Westie, 1963; Secord and Backman, 1964; Brown, 
1965; Cook, Burd, and Talbert, 1970). 
Cartwright's outline of some principles of persuasion suggests the cumu-
lative nature of an "affective-cognitive-conative" attitude paradigm. This 
paradigm presupposes the creation of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral 
(action) structures in a groJp context (1949). Changes in behavior are ini-
tially dependent upon changes in one's cognitive structure (Schramm, 1948: 
183-184; Merton, 1957:519). but any further effort to influence a person's 
..• must attempt either to modify needs (and goals) or to change 
the person's motivational structure as to which activities lead 
to which goals. This means that a person can be induced to do 
voluntarily something that he would otherwise not do only if a 
need can be established for which this action is a goal or if 
the action can be made to be seen as a path to an existing goal 
(Cartwright, 1949: 302). 
Hence, this approach to the communication (persuasion) process encompasses. 
both the reception of messages (i.e., acquisition of knowledge) and its 
implications for potenti~l behavior. Inasmuch as the principles are valid, 
Cartwright asserts, 
... they should apply to all inductions (of behavior) whether 
through the mass media or in a face-to-face situation. They 
should also apply to inductions attempted for all types of pur-
poses, whether to sell, to train, to supervise work, to produce 
therapy, and so on (1949:306). 
' 
Chapter II 
Research Design 
The generalizability of Cartwright's formulation to the realm of small 
group research highlights the theoretical rationale offered in the preceding 
chapter. By postulating the existence of internal structures which determine 
whether attitudinal and behavioral changes occur, the present researcher be-
trays a socio-psychological bent. And th·e method of inducing certain behavior 
constitutes his research design. From the following design, therefore, change 
in the Ss' knowledge, motivation, and inclination to act can be systematically 
observed. Also from the ensuing empirical data, one can make inferences about 
the operation of the unmeasurable structures. 
The design is patterne~ after the Lewin and the Pelz comparisons of the 
lecture and the group discussion--which is more effective for bringing about 
change in an individual's attitude and subsequent behavior? The study, how-
ever, is premised upon two questions raised by Fitzsimmons and Osburn: 
I. What learning takes place (in each stimulus situation)? 
t:ere the basic concern is whether or not people absorb and 
retain information about social issues. 
2. To what extent do these (stimulus situations) affect a per-
son's potential to behave in a manner consistent with his 
information (e.g., to learn more, to vote for change, and to 
form groups)? (1968:380). 
Specifically, is a participatory ~nstead of a passive information-getting situ 
ation more conducive to creating a norm or exposing a latent norm for acting 
to alleviate some social problem (in this case, drug abuse)? To reiterate a 
relevant research finding, Katz and Lazarsfeld reply, 
-~~ ..... .., ' - ,, _,.,_.,._-4'_,,.......,._,_ • .• _,.-,,,...,-~ •. _,.. 1··---""w-~·--- . • . ····- ,, ............. ~·•t.-•P<-· - '"'· .,..--, . ·- ... '•'-4'»·---~ ... ·~-- -~..; 
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Apparently, something about interacting with others relative· 
to a proposed change, compared with the isolation of the indi-
vidual in both lectures and private instruction, produces a 
marked behavioral change {1955:76). 
That "something" embedded in the way individuals relate to each other even 
in an ephemeral group (which is experimentally constructed) contributes to the 
salience of the situation. The pursuit of this issue--whether.group salience 
or non-involvement in an informal discussion group is the source of variation 
in the Ss 1 manifestations of knowledge and motivation to act on that know-
ledge--delimits the scope of the study. 
·subjects were 108 students enrolled in compulsory introductory sociology 
and psychology courses at the Niles College (seminary) branch of Loyola Uni-
versity and in an undergraduate statistics class at Loyola. Each S was ad-
ministered a pre-communication information exam (thirty multiple choice and 
true-false questions) on drug terms and drug facts. Incorporated into this 
instrument was a series of personal history questions {age, year in school, 
etc.) and a question tapping the s•s predilection for volunteer work in gen-
eral: 11Please list the campus activities {campus dubs and organizations) in 
which you pa rt i c i pate. 11 The purpose of this inquiry is to gauge the amount 
of extra-curricular (voluntary) activity engaged in by the sample under scru-
tiny. Another question geared to the test material--the subject of drugs--was 
posed: 11Would you be interested in participating in a volunteer program for 
helping drug abusers?" The ~sponse denotes 11simple awareness of the problem" 
(Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:382). Ss affiliated with two or more voluntary 
campus groups, including Apostolates for Niles students, and who affirm a 
-6-
willingness to serve in a hypothetical activity related to drug abuse, comprisj 
the "hi interest" group; the remainder of Ss are considered the "lo interest" 
group. The separate data collected on actual voluntary behavior and the en-
dorsement of a volunteer project to allay the drug problem enables precise 
initial analysis of a variable monitored throughout the research. 
Seven days after the pre-communication exam, Niles Ss were randomly as-
signed to an experiemental (E) or a le~ture only (L) condition~ Each group 
heard a formal lecture on drugs delivered by a sociologist specializing in 
addiction research. To establish credibility, he was introduced as such. 
An individual's tendency to accept a conclusion advocated by a 
given communicator will depend in part upon how well informed and 
intelligent he believes the communicator to be ..... It seems nee-
essary, therefore, to make a distinction between l) the extent 
to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of val id 
assertions (his 'expertness') and 2) the degree of confidence in 
the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he con-
siders most valid (his 'trustworthiness'). In any given case, 
the weight given a communicator's assertions by· his audience will 
depend upon both of these factors, and this resultant value can 
be referred' to as the 'credibility' of the communicator (Hovland, 
Janis and Kelley, 1953:21). 
During the question-and-answer period following the address in the L situa-
tion, the lecturer dogmaticall~ answered questions without departing from 
the text of his paper. This procedure was intended to maximize the Ss' 
trust in the communicator since he was perceived as intending not to per-
-7-
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1·.:ade, but ju•t to info•m the audlenoe (Ho•i1nd, J1nlo ind ~lley, 1953•23). 
Loyola (i.e., control) Ss did not hear the lecture. 
Following the address in the E situation, however, nine discussion 
groups were formed. Each was composed of a former drug addict and 8-12 Ss. 
They informally discussed (for 25 minutes) drug abuse as a social issue, as 
well as the ex-addict 1s personal experiences and insights. When person-to-
person influences coincide with mass media messages, they either counteract 
or reinforce the messages. This is the 11 reinforcement function 11 of the 
small albeit impromptu group condition. 
And there is substantial reason to suspect, when the rein-
forcement is positiv~, the communication in question is 
likely to be particularly effective (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
1955:45). 
Because the effectiveness or success of the communication can be measured by 
the breadth of factual information the S learns, the informal discussion ses-
sion supplements the lecture in a cathartic way (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; 
80). By providing an outlet for 11 talking out11 questions stimulated by the 
lecture, the 11 rap 11 session intervenes in the Ss 1 learning of the material. 
This learning factor ..• operates in compicated ways in communi-
cation situations, where the time between learning and testing 
is not a learning vacuum. The intervening social experiences 
have an effect on the retention of a complex, socially signifi-
' cant communication (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:131). 
Furthermore, the interpersonal contact removes some of the emotional 
insulation surrounding a given attitude or way of behaving. This is the 
-8-
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intrinsic reward derived from the group's clarification of the lecture material. 
The S's comprehension of the communication "evokes satisfying anticipations of 
attaining a goal or of averting a threat" (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:22 ). 
And personal influence bec0111es a 11facllltator 11 of change (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
1955:81). 
Thus, any active participation device which augments retention 
of the content of a communication may ultimately influence accep-
tance by increasing the chances that the content subsequently 
wi 11 be thought about or expressed under conditions where rein-
forcement can occur. One would expect this type of carry-over 
effect to be especially. prominent in the case of persuasive com-
munications which deal with opinions that are contingent upon 
·retention of a high degree of information content .•• (Hovland, 
Janis, and Kelley, 1953:233). 
The '~eedbac~' of the group situation affords the S an opportunity to 
reformulate the communication in his own words. 
It is possible that reformulation per se may give rise to a 
marked gain in compreh~nslon (italics theirs) of the content and 
thereby augment the chances that the persuasive communication 
will be influential. Opinion change may be facilitated by the 
mere act of translating the content into a more familiar voca-
bulary--perhaps by making It more meaningful in that the impli-
' cations of the arguments become more apparent and the conclusions 
more easily assimilated Into the person's existing cognitive frame-
work of beliefs, expectation; and values (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 
-9-
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1953:233-234). 
In sum, a climate of group discussion induces the S to improvise his own 
ideas in response to or support of the communicator's conclusions. Through 
this reciprocity the probability that the Swill experience the type of rein-
forcements and anticipations which make for acceptance, remembrance, and 
behavioral change is enhanced. Indeed, this is the compelling role that per-
sonal influence plays. 
Immediately after the Ss experienced one of the post-communication treat-
ments (E or L), all completed a second thirty-question "objective"-type 
exam on drug facts and terminology based on the lecture. Included was a re-
quest to indicate interest in a defined activity: "Would you be willing to 
participate in a volunteer telephone service for helping. individuals with 
drug problems if such a service were created in this community?" Reply to 
this question represents the extent of "positive solution-oriented" concern 
(Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:382) and reveals Ss dichotomized by "hi con-
cern" and "lo concern." 
Data on a second major variable emerge here, too. Increase in drug 
knowledge (DK)--comparing each S's score on Tes.t I and Test 11--is due pre-
sumably to the information absorbed from the formal lecture and reinforced 
(in the E condition) by the unstructured interaction session with the ex-
addicts. The catalytic role of the ex-addict in each E group intensifies 
as the group gets larger (though in this case, not exceeding twelve in number) 
' Bales found that 
•.• more and more communication is directed to one member of the 
group (the most frequent commun·icator), thus reducing the relative 
-JO-
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time the recipient of this increased attention begins to direct more and 
more of his remarks to the group as a whole, and proportionately less to 
specific individuals. The communication pattern tends to 'centralize,• 
In other words, around a leader through whom most of the communication 
flows (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:89-90). 
Although the leadership of the ex-addict was built into the E condition, 
It becomes "sanctioned" when the Ss gain cognizance of an addict 1s presence. 
He becomes tacitly 11nominated 11 as a situational leader "by virtue of his 
social location" in the group. His leadership inheres in the structure of 
the evolving pattern of communication. But moreover, the former addict is 
a ··•culturally certified" leader who influences others because he occupies a 
position in the group. It is the group's particular culture or frame of 
reference which endows the addict with the 11 right 11 to influence (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955:99). 
Leadership may refer to the point of origin of a plan or an idea, to 
thesanction of the idea, or to the diffusion (italics theirs) of 
the idea. An individual qualifies as a key communicator if he ful-
fills any, or all of these roles. (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:109). 
While the Ss ascribe to him the status of an 11authority, 11 they can relate to 
him as a "peer" in every other way--age, appearance, general interests. In-
deed, the ex-addict is both certified and approachable, ideal qualifications 
.. for a "discussant" in the E treatment. 
DK scores of control Ss exposed neither to the lecture nor the discussion 
reflect individual inforn1ation-gefting behavior in the span between adminis-
-11-
tration of the two exams. The contention is that the latter DK scores will 
represent curiosity aroused by the first exam which motivated the S to pur-
sue the drug topic and learn relevant material on his own. 
Three days after the post-communication exam, a mimeographed "flyer" 
inviting students to volunteer for the Maine Township "Hot Line" (HL) was 
deposited under the door of each S's room (campus residence). This memo 
instructed him to sign up for the "training session" to be held fourteen 
days hence. There was a booth prepared at the rear of Niles' student dining 
hall for the purpose of volunteering. Only one evening hour (5:30-6:30 PM) 
on two successive days, however, was allotted for this purpose. Though action 
(i.e., signing up) does not signify a final commitment to the HL program, it 
does signal a readiness to translate recognition of the ·problem (Test I) into 
constructive activity to abate the problem. "Hi commitment" or "lo (lack of) 
commitment," therefore, denotes the transition from an action orientation 
(Test II) to "action imp! ications" (Cook, Burd and Talbert, 1970:359). Con-
trol Ss were excluded from the voluntary activity, i.e., they were not for-
mally notified about volunteering. 
Because commitment as a behavioral tendency is a crucial variable ante-
cedent to "action" (not measured per se in this study), it is considered a 
primary outcome variable. Since the ostensible reason for the study (and 
for the sustained cooperation of the students) was given as ''an experiment 
in knowledge decay, 11 a third DK exam was administered to all the Ss midway 
' between the distribution of flyers and the scheduled training session. This 
thirty question objective exam measured the amount of decay (forgetting) in 
DK over time (four weeks) among the three treatment groups (Hovland and Weiss, 
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1952; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:30-41; McGuire, 1968:254-258). 
several researchers report that the more completely material is ini-
tlally learned the longer it will be remembered. This claim harbors impor-
·tant imp! ications with respect to the repetition of major points, if their 
retention is deemed desirable by the researcher. Consequently, 30% of the 
questions appearing on DK Tests II and III were identical to or adaptations 
of questions asked on the previous exam. The recal I and "relearning" of 
detailed factual information warrants these repeated presentations (Hovland, 
Janis and Kelley, 1953:248). Also, 
the extent to which communications will be retained would be expected 
to be affected to a significant extent by the motivations and inter-
ests of the audience. These will affect not only the quantity of 
the material which will be retained but also certain of the quali-
tative features of what is retained ... The degree of interest in 
material affects the extent to which the individual will learn the 
content of the communication. How well it has been learned will 
then affect how well it will be retained. This is a phenomenon with 
which we are all familiar: we learn what we are interested in (Hov-
land, Janis and Kelley, 1953:249-250). 
' Thus, past research recommends the usage of a .third DK exam for rendering the 
study more "legitimate" from the S's perspective and lending continuity to 
the investigation as a whole (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949; Lana, 
1959; Rosnow, 1966). ' 
Action (i.e., the act of volunteering) can finally be examined in re-
ference to cognitions about drugs progressing from interest to concern to 
-13-
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c011111itment and paralleled by an increase in drug knowledge. Posited as the 
central variable differentiating commitment to a voluntary program from non-
c011111itment is the motivational influence of personal contact. 
Why assign Ss to either an E or L treatment? The inclusion of an "equi-
valent control group" that has not been exposed to the formal communication, 
but for whom the same knowledge measures and personality measures are ob-
tained, is a check on various artifacts. These artifacts may give rise to 
spurious relationships between a given trait and the amount of knowledge 
change (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949:329-340). This "controlled 
exposure design" is capable of yielding results which show how people on 
different levels of a personality dimension are influenced by different com-
munication milieux. 
Control variables. The personality dimension selected in this study is 
11closed-mindedness"--one aspect of the individual's total belief system "dis-
covered," conceptualized, tested, and revised by Rokeach (1961). The past 
decade, however, has witnessed a vigorous debate in the literature on the re-
lation of intelligence to open- and closed-mindedness. Hence, an academic 
aptitude score based on the verbal section of the SAT (derived from the 
student's admission records) and a Rokeach Dogmatism Scale score were ob-
tained for each S. These scores are hypothesized as accounting for, respec-
tively, the S's capacity to learn and his receptivity to new information, re-
gardless of topic (Rokeach, 1961:286; Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:381). 
' Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale was designed to measure individual differences 
In the extent to which belief systems are open or closed (1961:72). After 
defining dogmatism as "resistance to change of a total 5ystem of be! iefs, 11 
-14-
Rokeach assessed the contribution of intelligence to the construct. He found 
a correlation of -.02 between intelligence (as measured by the American Coun-
cil on Education test) and scores on the Dogmatism Scale, and concluded that 
·~tndings in the present experiment cannot be accounted for by differences in 
Intelligence" (1961:190-191). Zagona and Zurcher 1 s data (1965a) also yield 
a small negative correlation, but more significantly, support the validity 
and test-retest reliability (for both high and low dogmatics) of the con-
struct. Ehrlich's findings (1961) corroborate two related hypotheses: that 
dogmatism is inversely related to classroom learning of sociology and that 
academic aptitude and dogmatism are independent. Christensen's replication 
supports only Ehrlich's second hypothesis, while providing "no evidence that 
dogmatism is related to classroom learning of psychology or differentially 
related to abilities to synthesize or analyze" (1961:76). Frumkin reports 
that low dogmatic individuals are more likely to earn high grades in sociology 
than individuals who score high on Rokeach 1 s Dogmatism Scale. 
A primary task for the sociology instructor. (is) to h~lp the 
student to unlearn these myths which dominate his conception 
of human behavior so that he might be free to gain objective 
knowledge about man's behavior and nature .•. biased, dogmatic 
individuals generally have a difficult time doing well in soci-
ology courses (1961:403). 
Ammunition for those espousing an intelligence-dogmatism interdependency 
' comes from Zagona and Zurcher's study of 517 freshman college students enrol le 
in psychology classes ~ta western university (1965b). They explain that the 
differences in performance found by Rokeach between high and low dogmatic in-
-15-
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dividuals solving various integration- and synthesis-type tasks are relatively 
independent of intellectual (verbal) ability. "A statistically significant 
(p<.01) relationship exists between factors s,eneral ly associated with intel 1 i-
gence and scores on the Dogmatism Scale" (1965b:219). 
Similarly, Ladd's data (1967) reveal that closed-mindedness hinders 
Initial adaptation to concept-learning more than the capacity to solve such 
problems, and that academic aptitude (measured by ACT scores) is positively 
related to concept-learning proficiency. In Fitzsimmons and Osburn's study 
·~erbal intelligence is an important factor in the learning of SIPA (social 
issues and public affairs) materials,'' although 'bpen-mindedness, as measured 
by the Dogmatism Scale, failed to predict information gain and changes in 
attitudes, attitude dimensions, or potential behaviors" (168:390-391). 
Finally, Ehr! ich and Lee caution that 
for some (cognitive) systems, open- and closed-minded persons will 
not differ in their rates of learning or change ••. but Rokeach's 
principle that high dogmatics are less able than low dogmatics to 
learn new beliefs was upheld (1969:259). 
Fortified by abundant data, the present research utilizes indices of 
intelligence and dogmatism (Form E of the Rokeach Scale plus ten "dummy" 
items mostly from the Adorno~~ F Scale) as control variables. In this 
way, disparities in the learning of drug information and subsequent voluntary 
action can be attributed to the experimental factor rather than to the ~ 
' priori assessment of intellectual (verbal) ability and the cognitive processes 
of "the closed mind." 
.. ,,·----~-,-~--,,.--~:..· .. ~-"''~- .. ~'-. 
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Hypotheses. I The theoretical import of personal influence and its oper- I 
ationalization in this research design dictates the proposal of the following 
major hypotheses. Since the experimental treatment is vital for the retention 
of DK materials presented in the lecture, Hypothesis I (H 1) states: 
The mean DK score (Test II) for the E group will be significantly 
greater than the mean DK scores for either the Lor C group. In 
operational terms, DKE;:-- DKL5=DK5. 
Likewise, it is anticipated that the empathy and concern engendered by 
the personal contact (i .e.,informal discussion) of experimental Ss with the 
ex-addicts will be manifested by a positive response to the post-communication 
inquiry (about prospective participation .in a service instituted to combat 
the drug problems of local youth). 
H2: Ss exposed to the E condition of personal influence will 
respond positively to the question "Would you volunteer for 
telephone service in a program designed to assist individuals 
with drug problems, were such a program established i~ this 
community?" to a significantly greater extent than those Ss 
not exposed (both Land C). 
When the opportunity to volunteer for the HL program arises, the notion 
of ''commitment to solution-oriented action" stressed in the E encounter wi 11 
again motivate those Ss involved in the "interaction treatment" groups. 
The percentage of E subjects who actually volunteer (sign up) 
' for HL service will be significantly greater than the percentage of 
L subjects. 
These three hypotheses encompass the process of converting factual 
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Information, curiosity, and conversation with "culturally certified" sources 
Into a demonstration of "personal responsibility" (Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 
1968:384). Thus, both "learning" and "experience" (originating in and cir-
cumscribed by this experiment) are linked to purposive activity. 
Assuming the equal distribution of SAT and dogmatism scores within the 
E, L, and C groups (homogeneity of variance), a one-way analysis of variance 
will be performed (Walker and Lev, 1953; Hays, 1963; Edwards, 1967). lndi-
cators of a growing predisposition to act in consonance with one's knowledge 
and experience consist of endorsement of a particular program and eventual 
commitment to volunteer service in that program. Ultimately, then, this 
thesis specifies how knowledge and experience manipulated in the present 
experimental context wi 11 affect observed action. 
•· 
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Chapter III 
Findings and Analysis 
Due to the populations involved, there exists a peculiar breakdown in 
the demographic characteristics of the Ss. The E group (N=54) accounts for 
one-half of the total number of people in the experiment. All of these Ss 
are seminary students at Niles College, as are the 33 comprising the L group. 
Whereas the E Ss are slightly older and one semester ahead of the freshman 
L Ss, and the 21 C Ss drawn from an undergraduate social statistics course 
at Loyola are, on the average, more than three years older and of second-
semester junior class standing. Admittedly, two distinct academic popula-
tions are represented here (see Table 1), but as will presently be shown, 
these potential biases inherent in the samples are experimentally control led. 
The use of SAT and Dogmatism Scale Scores anti;cipates the possibility 
of spurious results by discerning significant differences in intelligence 
and open-mindedness across groups. By identifying that the capacity of 
the Ss to learn new material and their cognitive disposition to do so does 
not vary significantly among respective groups, we can attribute any subse-
quent disparities in behavior to the differential experimental conditions. As 
seen in Table 2, nothing intrinsic to the members of the three groups so 
composed will either facilitate or hamper their later performance. We may 
conclude that the two "traits" metsured in Table 2 are randomly distributed 
-19-
,-------....···--..~~ .. ---.-· .. .,_. ...... ....-.... -----· ..--
th ...,,ghou t the 108 S• P" ti d pat 1 "g i" the m ea "h • 2 ~:-pe "o""e 1 , t hece foe] 
the three groups are qualitatively (i.e., psychologically) comparable. 
Primary Analysis: Testing of Hypothesis. The comparability of the group 
In intellectual ability and belief systems has been ascertained. Now we can 
assess the amount of drug knowledge the Ss possessed prior to experimental 
exposure. Table 3 reveals that all three groups were approximately equally 
knowledgeable about drug facts and terminology. This finding legitimates 
the formal lecture as a stimulus situation where new information is systema-
tically presented. The way this information is processed and the extent to 
which it is retained are implicit in the structure of the two experimental 
treatments. In the L treatment, the 25-minute presentation by a credible 
communicator was followed by a question-and-answer period. Here, the audience 
(Ss) was restricted to an essentially passive role in asking questions, while 
the communicator was instructed to confine his answers to the text of his 
2Decreased N's are due to the permission to use SAT scores and admini-
stration of the Dogmatism Scale--both of which appeared as part of the third 
instrument. Because some Ss refused to permit the Registrar from releasing 
their SAT scores or never took the test as a college entrance requirement 
and others failed to complete and return the third instrument, all groups N's 
were depleted. Of critical import is the attrition rate for the two experi-
mental conditions. Chi-squares computed for Ss not taking the SAT and the 
Dogmatism Scale are 0.07, I df artd 0.22, 1 df, respectively. These non-
significant chi-squares indicate that attrition did not differ across E and 
L conditions. 
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paper, i.e., his remarks were 
statements previously made. 
In contrast, the E Ss, after hearing the identical address, were divided 
into six 9-12 man groups. A young ex-drug addict was assigned to each where, 
as a "culturally certified" leader, he conducted an informal discussion on 
the topic of drugs. Postulated as a supplemental information-getting device, 
this interpersonal exchange situation becomes a medium for the flow of "per-
sonal influence" from addict to S (and S to S). This post-lecture E condition 
ts therefore hypothesized as reinforcing the material presented in the formal 
communication and facilitating its retention. Using the DK scores for Test 
II, this hypothesis (H 1) was tested. Inspection of Table 4, however, shows 
that the predicted difference in learning between the E and the L groups. did 
not occur. In fact, Ss experiencing the L treatment earned a higher mean 
score than the E Ss. The overall F-value of II .78 for the analysis of vari-
ance denotes that some difference among treatments exists. It suggests that 
the Ss experiencing the two experiemental treatmeots Jearned_more than the 
C Ss who were not exposed to the informative message. A significant differ-
ence between the pooled E plus L mean and the C mean confirms (t=S.25, p<.001 
for a two-tailed test) the efficacy of the lecture vs. no communication, but 
refutes the hypothesized reinforcement function of personal influence in the 
Interacting small group. 
An underlying theme of this research is that the bond be tween what one 
• 
knows and what one does is intimate indeed. By measuring the degree of one's 
general voluntary behavior (extra-curricular service activities) and his pro-
pensity to volunteer for a program based on a community need to assuage, if 
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not eradicate, the problem of drug abuse, the produndity of that bond can be 
demonstrated. Besides yielding measures of DK, Tests I and II trace the de-
velopment of an attitude consonant with that knowledge by (1) estimating the 
extant level of the Ss' participation in volunteer activities, and (2) en-
gendering interest, concern, and finally, commitment to a specific program. 
The research and instruments were so designed to create awareness of a pro-
blem and supply a goal for its 11 resolution. 11 What is distinctive ·about this 
means-ends schema is that the experiment sought to impel the Ss (through the 
dispensation of information) to adopt an "action orientation 11 for achieving 
the goal {by volunteering). 
Despite the moderate percentages of -"high voluntary" particpation (two 
or more activities) by E and L Ss (29.6% and 30.3% of each respective group), 
the interest and concern in a drug-related activity elicited via lecture and 
discussion are provocative. Table 5 indicates that there was virtually no 
difference between the percentage of E and L Ss who were "interested," while 
more than half of the C Ss--none of whom qual ifiep as "high _voluntary parti-
cipators"--were interested in an activity (as yet undefined) for combating 
drug abuse. Furthermore, the C group, without the benefit of the lecture or 
the addict encounter, heightened its empathy over time, whereas the "positive 
solution-oriented concern" of the E and L groups diminished. The combined 
percentage "concerned" of these latter groups is significantly smaller than 
the C group's percentage (p<.10). 
' This finding negates H2 which states that E Ss will respond positively 
to the question ''Would you volunteer for telephone service in a program de-
signed to assist individuals with drug problems, were such a program estab-. 
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Jished in this community?" to a significantly greater extent than either Lor 
c Ss. Not only is this hypothesis not borne out empirically, but the rank-
order of concern is seemingly reversed with C Ss manifesting the greatest will 
ingness to engage in the emergency telephone program (see Table 6). Perhaps 
this concern explains the absence of decay in the C group's third DK exam 
scores. Contrary to the debilitating effects of time in dissipating the 
. 
amount of DK retained--a "normal" phenomenon--the C Ss improved tliei r mean 
knowledge with the two-week increment of time. Again, by pooling the E and 
L means for Tests II and III, the mean decay for Ss in the experimental 
treatments can be compared to the "decay" of the C Ss. The forgetting of 
the former Ss was negligible (t=0.78); t~e increase in DK of the C Ss, how-
ever, is impressive (t=3.18, p<.OJ for a two-tailed test) and defies expla-
nation at this point. 
Considering the serendipitous content of the findings thus far, the 
third major hypothesis of this study emerges as unique in its simple dis-
creditation. Partly because only twelve of the ~7 Ss in th~ E and L groups 
(13.8%) signed up for HL service, the percentage of E Ss who volunteered was 
~significantly greater than the percentage of L Ss, as noted in Table 7. 
The modicum of difference between the two percentages does not even warrant 
statistical rejection, though a test was performed (non-significant at .JO). 
Before summarily dismissing the motivational influence of "learning" 
and personal contact as they were experimentally operationalized and mani-
• pulated, one can dwell briefly on the process of assimilating information over 
time. This incorporation and recollection process has here been termed 
"re I earning" and refers so I e 1 y to those i terns on Tes ts II and III which 
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appeared almost verbatim on each preceding exam. An item analysis of Test II 
shows that 23.3% of the questions were repeated from Test I and 36.6% of Test 
III material was introduced on Test II. The analysis of variance for these 
select items discloses that the differential treatments were non-trivial and 
somewhat effective (see Table 8) in imparting information which was readily 
recalled by subsequent DK exams. A post ho.c test of the pooled E plus L 
mean vs. the C mean supports the relearning hypothesis (t=4.SO, p(.001 for a 
two-tailed test) that repetitive presentation of a question (e.g., 11The 
highest incidence of drug use is found in a. medical professionals, b. clergy, 
c. college students, d. minority groups. 11 ) discussed in the lecture and/or 
small group was internalized by the E and L Ss. · 
Nevertheless, in the interim between administration of Tests II and III, 
decay takes its toll, depressing relearning scores for both experimental 
aggregates on the one hand, and inflating the mean score of the C group on 
the other. 3 This regression phenomenon for relearning scores replicates and 
amplifies the data in Table 6. Therein the relative level of DK for each 
. \ . group and its evaluation v1s-a-v1s scores for Test II are portrayed. In 
short, the inevitability of forgetting is tantamount to a consistency in re-
learning: both are predictable across groups. Their manifestations, how-
ever, vary with experimentally-induced 11 learning 11 and 11experience11 or the 
lack of each. 
-
3This is not evident in Table 9 since more items were inadvertently 
' 
repeated on Test III and no standardization procedure, e.g., converting 
to proportions or addi.ng a constant, was employed. 
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Secondary Analysis: Collapsing of Groups. Since the E condition un-
successfully evoked the hypothesized behavior (superior OK gain and higher 
Jevels of concern and volunteering), it seems fruitful to reassess all S 
according to criteria peripheral to the central focus of the research. 
Before abandoning the original group design and di6hotomizing the Ss by "hi" 
and "lo" participation in extra-curricular voluntary activities and by "hi" 
and "lo" interest {Test I), a fleeting glance at the trichotomy must be 
cast .. This perusal should lend credence to the decision to dissolve the 
experimentally-delineated boundaries between treatment groups. 
When interest is linked as an independent variable to Test II and DK 
scores, the means for each group divided into "hi" and "lo" segments barely 
differ. Across groups, the disparities in means are compatible with the 
findings reported above. However, when the groups are collapsed, thereby 
neutralizing the treatment effects, those Ss professing "lo" interest 
achieve higher DK scores on Test II (see column 1 of Table 10). The result-
ant t-value of 2.19 is significant at the .05 level of probability (for a 
two-tailed test). Thus, Ss can be motivated to learn though devoid of any 
interest in a volunteer activity predicated on the material learned. This 
lack of enthusiasm transcends group affi I iation (and differential "experi-
ence"), but begets speculation by this researcher on the operation of an,,. 
other factor. 
' 
A realignment of the "lo" interest Ss by the variable of extra-curricula 
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service4 produces no discernible differences in mean DK scores on Test II. 
When "hi" interest Ss are distributed with respect to voluntary behavior 
(Table JI), the mean difference is formidable (t=2.63, p(.02 for a two-
tailed test). To conclude that a volunteer "set" or predilection to parti-
cipate In service-oriented organizations prompts the learning of technical 
information relevant to the service would be facile and incorrect, espec-
ially since "lo" interest Ss excel when dimensions of voluntary action are 
disregarded (as conveyed by column I of Table 10). 
To confound the picture even more, the impact of interest on DK decay 
can be gauged. Do "hi" and 11 1011 interest equal Jy sustain the magnitude of 
DK over time? By surveying the first row of Table JO, we notice that the 
mean DK scores of "hi" interest Ss did not decay over time. Instead, the 
opposite tendency (similar to that evinced by the C group) appears: an 
accretion of knowledge over time. At-value of 1.93 (p(.10 for a two-tailed 
test) verifies albeit weakly this gain. 
Still another look at Table JO (row 2) shows that conventional, though 
. . 
not statistically significant, decay plagues the "Jo" interest group. Like-
wise, if we shift from a longitudinal to a cross-sectional perspective, we 
observe (in column 2 of Table 10) little absolute difference in the means 
for the "hi" and "lo" interest group. Indeed, "hi" interest endures in the· 
.
4us.ing the intuitive criteria of two or more voluntary activities as 
"hi voluntary behavior" and one or less as "lo voluntary behavior," a pre-
' liminary test of the independence of this and the interest variable was per-
formed. The resultant chi-square of 0.036 (106 df, not significant) sup-
ports the hypothesis of attribute independence. 
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Jong run and 11 1011 interest prevails when DK Is evaluated at a particular 
instant (Test II). The net effect is a learning impasse: both groups 
gravitate-toward a mutual level of DK. In essence, time and interest can-
cel each other out. 
The "concern" component represents another possible antecedent to learn-
ing. Curiously, only minute differences in nK means for Test III exist with-
In each treatment group--E, L, and C--and between the two contingents of Ss 
reconstituted by the "concern" and "no conce rn11 responses so Ii cited on Test 
II. This means that either (I) incipient interest exceeds "personal respon-
sibility11 (or concern) in forecasting who will learn more or (2) that time 
Is a more potent intervening variable in eroding DK than "hi" interest and 
concern. 
The issue of continuity between interest and concern--whether the S is 
interested in the beginning in any activity salutary to the drug abuser and 
is correspondingly concerned about its success--merits more detailed inves-
tigation. For an attitude which integrates these two operationalized phases 
will dictate unequivocal support for the telephone service formally proposed 
on Test II. Conversely, a S asserting "hi lnterest11- 11no concern" or 11 10 
interest 11-"concern11 reflects a neutra 1 or transitory posture toward the 
issue--an issue more arduously defined by the "HL flyer" distributed to 
foster an "action orientation." Thus, as the time for volunteering draws 
near, the requests for commitment become more specific and urgent. Is the 
f 
affinity, then, between interest and concern concomitantly strong? 
Table 12 depicts a series of contingency tables for two subsample 
·of Ss--the 79 who completed al 1 measures and the 29 who presumably lost 
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interest in the experiment and withdrew after Test II. The significant chi-
squares of both testify to the high probability of association between attri-
butes. Not only does the H
0 
of independence not hold, but the strength of th 
interest-concern association for each subsample as computed for Pearson's 
coefficient of contingency5 (0.61 for N=79, 0.52 for N=29, 0.61 for total 
N=J08) is substantfal. These data signify the cumulative nature of the in-
terest-concern proposition. Its promotion by experimental tactics seems 
certain (even in the abortive subsample). A lingering question, however, 
is to what extent were most Ss predisposed to endorsing any social action 
program, i.e., were the Ss attitudinally committed to "change" when they 
entered the experiment or were they selectively subscribing (by expressing 
interest and concern) to the problem at hand and the servke created to re-
l i eve it? 
In the cumulative process of penetrating the S' cognitive structure and 
instilling in him a consciousness of the drug problem, "concern" embodies tha 
portion of the message that just precedes the behavioral (and consummatory) 
facet of the experiment --the signing up for volunteer service in the Hot Lin 
As evidenced in Table 13, the association b~tween the variables of concern 
and volunteering for HL duty is statistically uncorroborated (X~=0.043 with 
Yates• correction for continuity). But moreover, if one concentrates momen-
-5The maximum C in a 2X2 table equalsW. where t equals the number of 
rows in the table. Therefore thf Cmax here equals 0.707. For a sophisticate 
treatise of alternatives to chi-squares based measures of association for 
nominal data, see Costner, 1965,.or McGinnis, 1958. 
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tarily on column 1, he surmises that twice as many Ss who signed up admitted 
"no concern" compared to those affirming "concern," the low N notwithstanding 
This fin~ing, too, defies all (theoretical and experimental) expectation. 
Comprising the "residual" analysis is the relation of general voluntary 
behavior to the primary outcome variable--volunteering for the HL. Table 14 
validates that such an association is statistically tenable 0:2=3.22, p<.10), 
though not overwhelming. Much can be inferred from this datum, yet much is 
sheer conjecture. Is a voluntary behavior "set" operating? Are people who 
participate in many voluntary activities and organizations just joining an-
other when they sign up for the Hot Line? Do "joiners" discriminate among 
"causes" and choose where they prefer to expend time and energy? Or is it 
just fashionable to be part of a movement oriented towards a contemporary 
social problem like "drugs and youth"? 
An alternative to this "positive association" interpretation is one that 
explores the interdependence of "lo" voluntary behavior and non-volunteering 
for the HL--the modal category in Table 13. If most college students do not 
usually volunteer their services at all, then why should they volunteer for 
the HL? Non-joiners are simply non-joiners, irrespective of the cause or 
movement involved. Thus, this "negative" or non-association proclivity com-
. 
plements, and simultaneously promulgates, the notion of a volunteer "set" 
or desire to affiliate with a multitude of "in" action groups (perceived as 
organs of social change): 
A foremost consideration is' also the population from which 80.6% of the 
Ss in the experiment was drawn, i.e. seminary students. These students are 
encouraged as part of theirpreparation for the priesthood to render some 
voluntary community service called an "Apostolate." Working in a hospital 
or nursing home, teaching catechism in local elementary and high schools, con 
ducting community seminars and masses, and organizing community social and 
day-care centers in ghetto areas are typical activities subsumed under the 
Apostolate, which has become institutionalized as requisite for the "forma-
tion" of the seminarian. 7 
Perhaps this and other obligations incumbent upon the Niles Ss precluded 
their participation in the HL program. Their academic situation and spiri-
tual training, however, propitiate the signing up of a large proportion. 
This seems commensurate with the "personal responsibility" the students 
should more readily manifest. Ostensibly, commitment to voluntary action 
was not forthcoming. One, therefore, is compelled to recognize that the 
mundane realities of time and prior commitment militate against extra-curri-
cular volunteering. Doubtless, experimental shortcomings proposing an ob-
jective, offering knowledge and experience as an incentive, and motivating 
individuals to express interest and concern in the appropriate channel can 
be cited. 
Before the shortcomings of the design are probed in the following chapte 
a methodological addendum.seemsfitting. The measures functioning as control 
variables--the SAT and Rokeach Dogmatism Scale scores--are amenable to more 
extensive analysis. Especially in deference to the diverse, and somewhat in-
congruous, findings in the Dogmatism literature, a correlational analysis of 
" intelligence and closed-mindedness seems obligatory. 
7My thanks to Bruce Such. for this and other insights into the Niles Col-
lege population. 
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Of greatest empirical import is the correlation coefficient for SAT and 
dogmatism scores of the 57 Ss on whom all measures were obtained. The r=-.255 
indicates an inverse relationship between the Ss' capacity to learn new infor-
mation and the receptivity or willingness to assimilate such information into 
their cognitive structure. To test the H0 : r=O, we transform the data-bred 
c;:orrelatfon into a t-value of 2.04 which is significant at the .05 level of 
probability. Similar efforts to relate SAT-DK gain and dogmatism-DK gain 
yield diminutive correlations {less than 0.00) for both the N=57 subsample 
and the N=79 subsample which includes 22 who lack SAT scores. Partial corre-
lation coefficients were concomitantly small. 
Thus, the recent trend ·in the literature is supported by the negative 
linear relationship deduced from the present data, This relationship, how-
ever, is reported with reservation until larger samples more representative 
of the secular college population are secured and tested. This impediment 
to the research of unique collectivities means, in the end, constricted gen-
eralization~-and reliability--of findings. 
' 
Chapter IV 
Interpretation of Findings 
The failures of the research design are manifold in that the three ex-
plicit hypotheses were empirically unfounded. In re-examining the formulation 
we can pursue two heuristic goals--interpretations of the present data as they 
append to the burgeoning literature and implications for future experimenta-
tion. 
Efficacy of the Small Group Milieu. Suffice it to say that the demarca-
tion between treatment groups Jacked clarity. Apparently, execution of the 
prescribed behaviors could have been more stringently controlled. For example 
the post-lecture discussion session where the ex-addicts exercised personal 
influence was structured to enhance the drug knowledge of the E Ss. This was 
supposedly accomplished through the 11 improvisation11 of Ss in verbal !zing 
points made· in the lecture and the reinforcement of that factual information 
by the addict-authority. Whether such behavior ever materialized prompts 
two critical observations about the quality or content of the subject-addict 
exchange and the duration of the discussion session. The researcher suspects 
that the ex-addicts substituted the communication of personal experiences and 
technique (e.g., how to "skinpop11 a drug, what sensations accompany the "nod, 11 
or what are typical symptoms of heroin withdrawal) for an elaboration of facts 
set forth in the lecture. Because the addicts were not constrained to com-
ment on the various terms or statistics transmitted in the formal address, 
those elements could have escaped the S who was not asked to deliberate on 
something to which the addict nei.ther directed his attention nor reinforced. 
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Pertinent, too, is the insufficient time that was allotted for the inter-
personal contact situation. An expansion of the 25 minute period to 45 or 60 
minutes would serve a dual purpose. First, it would expedite the addicts• 
nomination, location, and cultural certification as a "facilitator" of learn-
Ing in the group (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:81). As the addict 9.!:!2. leader 
becomes sanctioned as an "informational social influence" (Deutsch and Gerard· 
1955:629), the Ss are apt to accept information from him as "evidence about 
reality. 11 Between "the expression that he gives and the expression that he 
gives off" (Goffman, 1959:2), the addict capitalizes upon situational cues 
to embellish his image and aggrandize his status in the group (Alexander and 
Epstein, 1969:383, 393). Only then can he evoke a ·~efinition of the situa-
tion" (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927:68) in the Ss' minds which concretizes his 
(I) personification of certain values (who he is), (2) his competence (what 
he knows), and (3) his strategic social location (whom he knows) (Katz, 1957: 
205). Hence, the Ss' perception of the addict validates his role and his 
performance. The subsequent flow of influence has been anticipated by two 
diametric approaches to the phenomenon: Heider's "interest in the cognitive 
structures of causality attribution" and the "interpersonal imputation pro-
cesses" that form the very core of classic symbolic interactionist theory 
! 
(Alexander and Epstein, 1969:382). This initial perception will not only be 
a determining factor in learning the material presented in the lecture, but 
wi 11 have "a persisting effect on the remembering process" (Hovland, Janis 
' 
and Kelley, 1953:252). 
By interpolation, the interface of Sand addict (or leader and follower} 
constitutes the former 1 s justification as a 11significant other'' in a temporary 
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version of the Meadian concept. His salient position in this contrived small 
group8 is both a function of the information he disseminates (even indirectly: 
and the attitude(s} he alters. 
Structural factors influence the kinds of significant others to 
which ego is exposed, and the kinds of information that those 
significant others communicate to ego, and that information ••• 
provides the basic corpus out of which he sets his attitudes. 
That information is evaluated in terms of its consistency with 
previously accumulated information (i.e., other related atti-
tudes) and results in the new attitude (Woelfel and Haller, 
1971:76-77). 
In this sense, the affective and cognitive components of the E S's 
attitude are modified by the discussion session. Lewin's pioneer work is onc1 
again supportive: 
decision in a group setting seems to be effective even if the 
group is not a permanent organization (1947:430). 
But no such decision was ever reached in the small groups because the leader 
never ended the discussion with a request that individuals publicly announce 
their decision regarding the prescribed action. Since the Ss were never so 
informed, their intentions never became known, and their participation in 
the Hot Line was never overtly enlisted. Logistically, therefore, the design 
8 f 
Though small in size and featuring informal face-to-face contact, this 
group does not fulfill the rest of Cooley's (1909) comprehensive "primary 
group" definition--relative durability and "manifold, or more or less un-
specialized, purpose." 
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violated Lewin's basic procedure. 9 
Just as the E treatment encouraged spontaneity, so did it discourage 
uniformity in the substance of the verbal exchange transpiring in each group. 
Briefing of the addicts as to the tenor and purpose of their remarks is a 
sound precaution. Without it, "personal influence" can be irrelevant to the 
specified objective of the experiment. 
Motivation to Learning and Voluntary Action. Apart from the finding 
(see Tables 4 and 8) that E Ss did not learn more despite structural con-
duciveness {Hypothesis 1), their interest and concern were inordinately low 
relative to the C group {see Table 5). How do interest and concern affect 
learning and the retention ·of DK? Though the current findings are not un-
precedented, they are uncommon. Fitzsimmons and Osburn report that 
Ss, prior to exposure, were (1) already moderately willing to 
go out of their way to gain further. information, (and) (2) per-
sonally willing to devote some volunteer time ... (1968:388). 
Table 12 reveals the Ss' similar inclinations and their impact on Hypothesis 
2. Even if we assume that the audience initially has only a rather passive 
interest, then the arousal of motivation to learn the message is essential 
for a gain in drug knowledge. 
< 
91t may have also deviated from ideal small group size of 3-8 and had an 
inhibiting effect on the Ss. Although Bales and Homans agree that this large 
membership wi 11 "centralize" the 'communication pattern around the leader, 
others argue that the leader's influence is thereby attenuated. See Katz 
and Lazarsfeld, 1955:88-90. 
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Retention may also be affected by the degree to which the person 
is motivated on subsequent occasions to try to recall the material 
learned. Degree of motivation frequently affects the degree to 
which the individual will rehearse the material he has learned 
(Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:250). 
"Rehearsal" or "improvisation" in the smal I group mi I ieu proved ineffec-
tual. But drug knowledge scores also vacillated because too little informa-
tion was repeated on each exam. Thus, instead of "relearning," Ss were re-
quired to assimilate new material that was presented on each exam. Perhaps 
this task accounts for the erratic means of the groups computed in row 1 and 
column I of Table JO. The plethora of terms and facts dispensed in the for-
mal communication (lecture) and on the three drug tests may have overloaded 
the cognitive apparatus of the Ss who either "tun.ed out" or selectively 
filtered fragments of information into their minds. 
Fitzsimmons and Osburn, in testing the Hyman and sheatsley "selective 
perception" hypothesis (1947), found that there was no discernible influence 
of initial attitude positions on the learning and retention of pertinent 
information. Yet virtually all Ss who scored low on the pre-experimental 
test of knowledge about television news documentaries proceeded to learn a 
' great deal, and often revised their attitudes toward this journalistic ap-
preach to pub I i c affairs and social issues. They cone l ude that "the ex-
perience of 'finding out how little one knows• may facilitate change" (Fitz-
simmons and Osburn, 1968:392). ' Future studies on the dynamics of learning 
would profit from the repetition of at least 50% of all material in a series 
of "technical" knowledge exams. 
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From Hypothesis 3 we have inferred that the commitment of the E Ss was 
no greater than that of the L Ss (se~ Table 7). This finding impels one to 
search for a clue to understanding the alliance between motivation and action 
(signing-up). Lewin advises us 
to study the particular conditions under which a motivating 
constellation leads or does not lead to a decision or to an equi-
valent process through which a state of 'considerations' (inde-
cisiveness) in changed into a state where the individual has 
'made up his mind' and is ready for action, although he may not 
act at that moment (1947:428). 
This underpinning of Lewin'.s research converges with the present thesis that 
lecturing may lead to a high degree of interest. It ~ay affect 
the motivation of the listener. But it seldom brings about a 
definite decision on the part of the listener to take a certain 
action at a certain time. A lecture is not often conducive to 
decision (1947:428). 
Katz and Lazarsfeld venture that 
the individuals in the lecture and private situations might 
even have been as 'motivated' to change as those in the dis-
cussions, but that the chances of translating their moti-
vations into action were considerably reduced when the action 
demanded unilateral departure--as far as these individuals 
' knew--from some socially accepted way of doing things {1955: 
78). 
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If volunteering was inhibited in this way, then a favorable attitude 
toward the Hot Line was not embedded in perceptions that the attitude object 
(i.e., the Hot Line) would "guarantee" need satisfaction. Indeed, 
change in an attitude was attempted by increasing the S's aware-
ness of the instrumentality of the attitude object for attaining 
a specified need rather than an indirect orientation toward 
multiple needs or values (DiVesta and Merwin, 1960:285). 
Whereas attitude shifts may act as an intermediary between information 
gain and adoption of an action orientation (Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968;390) 
this orientation or commitment is in itself not motivating (Kiesler, 1968). 
Furthermore, unless the attendant cognitions have reward-cost implications 
for the chosen course of action they will have no effect on the person's 
cognitive work and will themselves be unaffected (Gerard, 1968). 
The data presented in Tables 10 and_l3 negate the confluence of motiva-
tion, information, and commitment on voluntary action. Yet this finding has 
bifurcated roots in the social science literature. Fitzsimmons and Osburn 
detect no relationship between information gain and changes in potential be-
havior in reaction to television documentaries (1968:390), while Cook, Burd, 
and Talbert conclude that 
if the opportunity to perform an attitude-relevant act is not 
made immediately available, then the (presumed) attitudinal 
predisposition to perform the behavior will become progressively 
f 
less strong as time goes by. What this makes salient is that tests 
of the relationship between attitude and behavior should assess 
attitude and behavior immediately after receiving a message, if 
-38..;. 
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this is possible (1970:368). 
Did delayed administrationof·the DK tests interfere with the reinforcement 
mechanism of personal influence as it impinged on the conative (behavioral) 
aspect of the S's attitude? Heider (1958), we believe, would nod affirmative] 
and allude to attitude structure as a causal factor; Katz and Stotland would 
opt for attitude functions declaring that '~here the primary function of an 
-
attitude is to gain understanding of one's world, there is little reason to 
expect overt behaviora I changes"' 0 (Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968: 394). 
The element of time not only dilutes the S's motivation (interest, con-
cern, and commitment), but also hastens knowledge decay. An obstacle to 
cognitive functioning, time mitigates retention of certain information 
("selective forgetting") as it robs decisional outcomes that were important 
at an earlier time of their saliency and their urgency (Waister and Berscheid 
1968:605-607), 
The data summarized in Tables 6 and 9 do not contradict McGuire's 
appraisal of the deleterious effects of source, message, and receiver factors 
occurring with the passage of .time (1968:254). Nevertheless, Tables 10 and 
12 suggest two divergent trends: (I) that there is an information-processing 
delay in receiving the formal communication, but (2) that any induced atti-
tude change tends to become functionally autonomous of broader aspects of 
the communication that are retained (McGuire, 1968:256-258). Such recol-
lection is predictable: 
' 
IOFestinger, in his Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), strives to do 
both, i.e., capture the balance of attitude and action that is Imperiled by 
workaday interaction. 
Once an individual decides on a course of action--and espec-
ially after he commits himself to follow it--all cognitive work 
seems focused on consolidating and making the best of the de-
cision {Aronson, 1968:611). 
Thus, the operation of interest and commitment {volunteering) "sets" {Tables 
11, 12, and 14) enters the realm of both theoretical and empirical plausi-
bility, if not probability. 
Attitudes and Behavior: A Methodogical Purview. A methodological ad-
junct is submitted, howeve.r, by Mi I !er: 
The researcher typically concludes the experiment by tacking on a mea-
sure of retention and then reports .that the lack of differences 
implies that the effects of the experimental treatment on atti-
tudes were not mediated by differences in retention. While the 
most obvious criticism of this procedure is to question the 
sensitivity of the measure of recall, an alternate hypothesis 
is that motivated forgetting is less I ikely. to appear _if at-
tempts to measure it are always positioned last {Miller, 1968: 
598). 
The ramifications of this contention are cogent: just as a S can be more or 
less receptive to a message, so may his decay in learning be a methodological 
imperative, i.e., a function of the design involved. 11 
Within this framework, the limitations imposed upon the generalizability 
' 
11 For an exhaustive survey of experimental designs and sources of inva-
lidlty therein, see Campbell (1957), Campbell and Stanley (1963), Ross and 
Smith (1968), and Wiggins (1968). 
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of the current findings can be weighed. Despite the student sample (of 
predominantly seminarians, to boot) used, .Fitzsimmons and Osburn assert 
that 
this population represents an excellent group upon which to test 
a theory of rationally based attitudes, where information gain 
is critical. Support for such an attitude function would then 
call for further testing of a more heterogeneous population -(1968: 
392). 
In this case, a sampling of students at many seminary schools in the Midwest 
could be fruitful, though the use of Ss not immersed in a religious prepara-
tory curriculum would yield indices of more widespread application. This 
revision would also prescribe a deletion of variables and the discarding of 
hypotheses (Wiggins, 1968:390). 
In retrospect, Katz (1960) observes that since our educational system 
relies on a rational mode of fact communication; the value of intelligence 
and comprehension in the fonna ti on and change of. a man's at.ti tu des has be-
come sancrosanct. This value is implicit in Rokeach's attempt to identify 
a cognitive structure that could account for receptivity to new information, 
regardless of topic. The present data replicate the failure of Fitzsimmons 
and Osburn's study to support the intervening role of "open-mindedness," as 
measured by the Dogmatism Scale, in the learning of information (1968:396). 
But while dogmatism scores did not predict attitude shifts in their inves-
' tigation, open-mindedness was significantly correlated with intelligence for 
57 of our Ss. Fitzsimmons and Osburn's interpretation of their failure is 
profoundly linked to our partial success. 
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Initial position on a variety of variables failed to have the 
'controlling' function over subsequent changes that frequently 
has·been ascribed to it. This seems to imply that people will 
change or fail to change despite their initial position on 
some of these variables. The authors believe that there may 
be a difference between learning information that does not 
particularly contrast with held values, and learning infor-
mation that is in opposition to beliefs. In this latter 
case, the construct of open-mindedness may well come into 
play (1968:397). 
A final recommendation for further experimentation in the domain of atti 
tudes and motivated learning springs from a theme pervading small groups re-
search: Is the jump from cognitive concern (i.e., based on knowledge and 
interest) to an action orientatiQn to action warranted? Because attitudes 
are hierarchically-ordered predispositions to behave in various ways, it 
follows 
that changes in these predispositions should be followed by 
corresponding changes in behavior. Furthermore, such changes 
in attitudes ~hould produce enduring and general changes in 
behavior if attitudes are themselves enduring and generalized. 
Research relevant to this topic has unfortunately indicated 
that such a conclusion is false. Changes in attitude are not 
' 
necessarily accompanied by changes in behavior. (And) when 
changes in behavior do occur, they are rarely, if ever, general 
or enduring (Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1970:85). 
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If attitude change does not lead to behavior change (Cook, Burd, and Talbert~ 
1970:368), then the conception of the transition mentioned above may, indeed, 
be fallacious. 12 If so, the transmission of information and its reinforce-
ment through personal influence may be approached in a "social learning" con-
text, whereby crucial bits of information held by the Ss are ascertained, 
and a technique (e.g., persuasive corR111unications) which is most likely to 
produce a change in such information is implemented. Thus, 
by changing the expected consequences for engaging in the crucial 
behavior, or by changing the associations with a crucial stimulus, 
we can change~ specific behavior ... (Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1970: 
93). 
12similarly, the prevailing theories of attitude change (see McGuire, 
1968:265-272) may need reconceptualization--if external behavior does not 
conform to the approximation of internal cognitive states. If so, the pre-
dictive power of the theories is deflated. 
' 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
This study has demonstrated that the concept of "personal influence" 
derived from panel-type fi~ld data does not hold in a small groups setting. 
Specifically, the "quasi-experimental" design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963), 
though simulating laboratory controls, did not induce differential learning, 
concern, and commitment to voluntary action as hypothesized. Instead, un-
wieldy group size, irrelevant informal communication, limited duration of 
the small group session, and time-delay in the administration of drug know-
ledge examinations encumber. the flow of personal influence in motivating 
seminary students to learn factual information about a social problem (atti-
tude object) and adopt an "action orientation" for its resolution. The oper-
ation of these exogenous variables suggests (1) that while initial interest 
in the attitude object is not a prime incentive to learning, (2) interest is 
highly associated with subsequent concern for an activity proposed as a 
deterrent to the problem. Yet (3) this endorsement of a voluntary program 
cannot be equated with a willingness to participate in it; rather, (4) 
individuals who participate in many volunteer activities are more apt to 
engage in another of social and topical significance. Thus, interest and 
volunteer behavior "sets" seem to be most predictive of eventual voluntary 
action. 
A moderate, though statistic'ally significant, correlation between Dog-
matism Scale scores and SAT scores implies that an individual's aptitude for 
learning new material is associated with the belief system or cognitive path 
-l14-
of "open-mindedness" or receptivity to that material. The .addition of this 
datum to the above findings indicates that (1) "personal influence" must be 
refonnulated, or at least modified, in a "small groups" context to underscore 
the reinforcement function of the culturally-certified informational leader, 
(2) a more parsimonious 'pre-posl' design encompassing the variables of learn-
ing, attitudes, and behavior in a cumulative way be employed, and (3) the 
theoretical interplay of attitudes and behavior be reconceptualized so that 
a "threshold of saliency" can be identified. Only then will an attitudinal 
dimension become empirically reliable and both the transmitters and objects 
of personal influence more purposively pursued in the field, and in the lab, 
as 'well. 
' 
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics: Means 
Group N Age Year in School 
E 54 18.6 1.5 
L 33 18.0 1.0 
c 21 21.8 3.5 
E 
L 
c 
Source of 
Variation 
Table 2 
Control Variables: Means and Variance Table 
(Dogmatism onlv) 
28 516.6 37 129.8 
18 507.9 21 135.7 
11 511.0 21 133.2 
SS df MS F 
Between Groups 502.51 2 251. 26 1.058* 
W-tthin Groups 18043.91 76 237.42 
Total 18546.42 78 
*not significant 
1 ··- ·Y'>~-.,,..--~~--~-,,_,..._,~-~,~-·-~'~U- ... ~ .,_,. -· 
i 
Table 3 
Pre-lecture (Test I) Drug Knowledge Scores: 
Means and Variance Table 
Groue N Store 
E 54 26.59 
l 33 26.06 
c 21 ' 26.43 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F 
Between Groups 5.82 2 2.91 0. 296;t 
Within Groups 1032.06 105 9.83 
Total 1037.88 107 
. 
;~not significant 
Table 4 
Post-lecture {Test II) Drug Knowledge Scores -
Comparison of Experimental and Control Conditions: 
Means and Variance.Table 
Group N Score 
E 54 27.09 
L 33 28.36 
E+L 87 27.57 
c 21 24.38 
Source of. 
Vari at ion SS df MS F 
Between Groups 205.64 2 102.82 11 . 78* 
Within Groups 917.13 105 8.73 
Total 1122. 77 . 107 
*p<.01 
Table 5 
Percentage of Groups Expressing lnterest (Test I} and Concern (Test II) 
in Voluntary Drug-related Activity 
··croup ·%Interest ·%concern 
E 40.7 33.3 
L 39,3 36.4 
E+L 40.2 34.5 
c 52.4 57.1 
---------·---·---.,,··~-------· --·-··-----...-.. .. ~ 4 . •"1 -=~·-----------------
Table 6 · · 
Decay Over Time (Test III) in Drug Knowledge Scores: 
Means and Variance Table 
Group·· N · · ·Score 
E 37 26.57 
L 21 28.14 
.c 21 .. 27 .10 
Source-of. 
Variation SS df° MS F 
Between Groups 33.28 2 16.64 1.55* 
Within Groups 816.46 76 10.74 
Total 849.74 78 
*not significant 
Table 7 
Percentage of Groups Volunteering for Drug Hot Line* 
Group %Volunteering 
E 8 14.8 
L- 12.1. 
*Control Ss not given an opportunity to 
volunteer 
Table 8 
Relearning Scores for Items R~peated on Test II: 
Means and Variance Table 
Group· N Score 
E 54 3.42 
L 33 3.76 
E+L 87 3.55 
c ... 21 2.43 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F 
Between Groups 23.59 2 11.80 7.92* 
Within Groups 156.41 105 1.49 
Total 180.00 107 
*p<.01 
' 
Table 9 
Relearning Decay Scores for Items Repeated on Test III: 
Means and Variance Table 
Group N Score 
E 36 5.89 
L 21 6.43 
c 21 .. 5.19 
Source of 
Variation· SS df MS F 
Between Groups 16. 21 2 8.10 3.07* 
Within Groups 195.94 75 2.64 
Total 211.15 77 
*not significant 
I l ... ,¥_----;~,>"'*-<1-·--·~---.. --. .,,.l"!li ..... --------·N!i-· .... = ....... ··-·-·!f-llJ __ ,..., ..... _____ _.. ___ _ 
I 
I 
II 
ilrl 
Table 10 
Effects of Hi and Lo Interest on Subsequent Drug 
Knowledge Scores (Tests II & III): Means 
Group Test II Test III 
Hi Interest 21.00 26.47 
Lo Interest· ... 26 .86 .. 25.67 
Table 11 
Interaction Effects of Hi Interest and Hi or Lo 
Voluntary Behavior on Drug Knowledge Scores (Test II): 
Means 
Group· N Score 
Hi in/ Hi vol Beh 11 28.09 
.Hii~/ Lo vol .Beh 33 . 18.64 
1----------....---------·-·-------·---------·-o..--·-·-·.....,,....,._._.. ........ ____ ..._. ...... ____________________ ...,,,...., 
Table 12 
Association between Interest and Concern: 
For the Subsample taking all Tests 
c nC 
Hi I 30 5 35 
Lo I 3 41 44 
33 36 
2 
.1 .. df x =46.70*, c 
For the Subsample taking Test I & II only 
C nC 
Hi r lli Lo I 
9 20 
2 . 
··~ c=l0.73*, 1 df 
For both Subsamples Combined 
Hi I 
Lo I 
*p .001 
*p .01 
C nC 
38 7 
4 59 
4~ 66 
x 2;::;:64 .12*, 1 df 
c . . 
10 
29 
45 
63 
Table 13 
Association Between Concern (Test II) 
and Volunteering for Hot Line* 
Vol non-Vol 
Con 
I 
3 
I 
17 20 
no Con 8 30 38 
11 47 
2 
.1. df x ~0.043**, 
.. C. 
*Only for E and L Ss taking all three exams; 
C Ss not given an opportunity to volunteer 
**not significant 
-----...... ----.-..--~·."."tt111t·~.,~~ lOGctt ·~·---------··~-------. 
Table 14 
Association between General Voluntary Behavior 
and Volunteering for Hot Line* 
H1vol heh 
LOvol beh 
Vol non-Vol 
5 9 
6 38 
11 47 
2 ·• 
.. Xc=3.22**, 1.af 
14 
44 
*Only for E and L Ss taking all three exams; 
C Ss not given an opportunity to volunteer 
**p<.10 
\ 
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